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UPGRADING EXISTING REGULATORY
MECHANISMS FOR TRANSATLANTIC
REGULATORY COOPERATION
C. BOYDEN GRAY*
I
INTRODUCTION
This is an exciting time to contemplate the future of international regulatory
cooperation, but it is also a sobering time.
It is exciting because regulatory cooperation is now being pursued on
multiple fronts more ambitiously than ever before. Some efforts like the
Canada–U.S. Regulatory Cooperation Council are already achieving results
today, and others currently in negotiations, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), could effect a
paradigm shift in international regulatory cooperation if they succeed. Both
agreements would go beyond traditional free trade agreements in that they
prioritize regulatory coherence and the removal of so-called “nontariff barriers”
in addition to traditional trade barriers. Particularly in the relationship between
the United States and the European Union (EU), such an agreement—what I
1
have previously called an “economic NATO” —is necessary to preserve the
U.S. and EU’s role as standard-setters and economic hegemons in an
increasingly competitive global marketplace.
On the other hand, this is a sobering time, because protectionist forces also
seem to be on the rise. These protectionist interests have severely hampered
efforts to unify regulatory approaches. Transnational bodies designed to pursue
regulatory uniformity, such as the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), have
2
become increasingly ineffective as a result of single-issue political gridlock.
Meanwhile, rising Euroscepticism demonstrated by last year’s parliamentary
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1. C. Boyden Gray, An Economic NATO: A New Alliance for a New Global Order, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL ISSUE BRIEF (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/403/
tar130221economicnato.pdf.view.
2. See Tyson Barker & James O’Connor, Resetting the Trans-Atlantic Economic Council: A
Blueprint, ATLANTIC COUNCIL & BERTELSMANN FOUNDATION 1 (Oct. 2009), http://www.atlantic
council.org/publications/reports/resetting-the-transatlantic-economic-council.
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elections has raised questions about TTIP’s viability in Europe. This political
ambivalence is nothing new; indeed, it has consistently been the limiting factor
4
on past efforts at transatlantic regulatory cooperation. But it does not mean
that the current push for regulatory cooperation is doomed to failure.
Recognizing the conditions on the ground, this article offers some practical
suggestions for achieving real progress on regulatory cooperation under
imperfect political circumstances. In particular, it discusses the optimal
leadership structure of transnational bodies dedicated to regulatory
cooperation, including the existing TEC. This article also comments on the
availability of existing regulatory mechanisms—specifically, negotiated
rulemaking—to achieve regulatory cooperation. Although such administrative
solutions are available even now to promote transnational regulatory
cooperation, TTIP is the best vehicle for institutionalizing these changes and
using them to achieve lasting transatlantic benefits.
Beyond these specific proposals, this article aims to encourage creative
thinking about what can be done in the service of regulatory cooperation using
5
existing international institutions. The EU’s recent crisis over Greece
underscores the importance of attaining regulatory cooperation. In contrast
with Greece, other European countries that have undergone regulatory reform,
such as Latvia and Germany (the former “sick man” of Europe prior to
6
reform), are now financially stable. Improving regulatory cooperation could
have a significant impact on global stability.
TTIP is not the first U.S. attempt at regulatory cooperation with the EU,
and one would do well to learn from the past. There have been at least nine
7
other such efforts—the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, the 1998 Transatlantic
8
Economic Partnership, the 1999 Joint Statement on Early Warning and

3. See Eurosceptic ‘Earthquake’ Rocks EU Elections, BBC NEWS, May 26, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27559714.
4. See, e.g., Soeren Kern, Why the New Transatlantic Agenda Should, But Won’t, Be Reformed,
REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO (2005), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_in/Content?
WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI+51-2005 (“Although the need to
reform the NTA is not in dispute, there is insufficient political will at the highest levels of government
on either side of the Atlantic to do so.”).
5.
Because I am writing from my experience as Ambassador to the EU, I take the transatlantic
context as my model, but I hope these thoughts will have some application to all regulatory cooperation
initiatives.
6. See Caroline Frontigny & Betina Tirelli Hennig, Latvia: Maintaining a Reform State of Mind,
BUSINESS
(2013),
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/
DOING
Documents/AnnualReports/English/DB13-Chapters/DB13-CS-Latvia.pdf; OECD Reviews of
Regulatory Reform: Germany 2004: Consolidating Economic and Social Renewal, ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 8, 11 (2004), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/governance/oecd-reviews-of-regulatory-reform-germany-2004_9789264107861en#page3.
7. New Transatlantic Agenda, EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION (1995),
http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf.
8. Transatlantic Economic Partnership, EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION (1998),
http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_econ_partner_11_98_en.pdf.
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9

Problem Prevention Mechanisms, the 2000 Consultative Forum on
10
Biotechnology, the 2002 Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and
11
Transparency, the 2004 and 2005 Roadmaps for U.S.–EU Regulatory
12
Cooperation and Transparency, the 2005 U.S.–EU High Level Regulatory
13
14
Cooperation Forum, and the 2007 TEC. The TEC was intended to oversee a
program of regulatory cooperation with the aim of reducing redundant tests and
15
regulations on a sector-by-sector basis. All of these initiatives aimed, in one
way or another, to reduce regulatory barriers between the United States and
Europe. And to varying degrees, they have achieved that goal. These initiatives
are responsible for stronger relationships and improved communication
between stakeholders and regulators across the Atlantic as well as for certain
16
sector-specific mutual recognition agreements.
Unfortunately, despite the strength of the U.S.–EU relationship, all of these
past efforts have failed to achieve a standardized process for cooperative
regulation on an ongoing basis—much less harmonization of existing
17
regulations. The “Lighthouse Priority Projects” of the TEC—harmonization of
patent regimes, mutual recognition of U.S. and EU accounting standards, for
18
example —remain beacons on the horizon rather than past achievements.
Today, on the threshold of yet another transatlantic agreement, regulatory
cooperation is still highly sought after. In a ranking of seventeen transatlantic
9. Joint Statement on Early Warning and Problem Prevention Mechanisms, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION (1999), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/tradoc_111711.pdf.
10. EU–US Biotechnology Consultative Forum Launched, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2000),
http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/15342_en.html.
11. Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2002),
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/guidelines3_en.pdf.
12. 2004 Roadmap for EU-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
(2004),
https://ustr.gov/archive/World_Regions/Europe_Middle
_East/Europe/US_EU_Regulatory_Cooperation/2004_Roadmap_for_EU-US_Regulatory_
Cooperation_Transparency.html; 2005 Roadmap for EU-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation and
Transparency, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2005), https://ustr.gov/archive/World_
Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Europe/US_EU_Regulatory_Cooperation/2005_Roadmap_for_EUUS_Regulatory_Cooperation_Transparency.html.
13. See
EU–USA—Regulatory
Cooperation,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
(2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/regulatorycooperation/index_en.htm.
14. See EU–USA—Transatlantic Economic Council, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/transatlanticeconomic-council/index_en.htm.
15. Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration Between the European Union
and the United States of America, § 4, Annex I, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise
/policies/international/files/tec_framework_en.pdf [hereinafter Framework for Advancing Transatlantic
Economic Integration].
16. See RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL34717, TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 15 (2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34717.pdf.
17. See id. at 12 (“While there have been numerous political declarations calling for regulatory
convergence and harmonization, few changes have been enacted in each side’s existing laws that would
move their regulatory regimes in this direction.”).
18. Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration, supra note 15, at § 3, Annex
II.
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regulatory goals, 120 stakeholders identified “significant regulatory process
19
convergence across multiple sectors” as most important to the success of TTIP.
But the respondents ranked that same goal among the most difficult to
achieve—second only to market access for genetically modified and hormone20
treated agricultural products.
II
SETTING REASONABLE GOALS
The first lesson to be drawn from the history of transatlantic agreements
might be the necessity of reasonable expectations. Despite many points of
commonality, the United States and Europe have divergent political values and
asymmetrical legislative and regulatory systems. The European precautionary
principle, for example, presents a practical barrier to mutual recognition of
regulatory standards in certain sectors—though the United States is more
21
precautionary in some other areas.
Likewise, basic differences of governmental structure between the United
States and the EU prevent perfectly parallel regulatory processes. To take one
example, EU regulatory agencies are not the agenda-setting, regulation-writing
bodies familiar on this side of the Atlantic. Instead, they serve a mostly reactive
function, providing technical and scientific expertise when consulted by the
European Commission (EC). By contrast, the European member states play a
more powerful policy-making role in implementing directives from the EC than
American states do in implementing laws passed by Congress. Finally, under
current internal EC working procedures, opportunity for public comment is
limited to the consultative process preceding the adoption of primary
legislation, akin to Advanced Notices of Proposed Rulemaking used only
occasionally in the United States. EC legislative proposals frequently contain a
level of detail comparable to U.S. rulemakings. Nevertheless, interested parties
have no chance to comment on draft text of a proposal or to convince the EC to
take their comments into account in revising it. In the United States, by
contrast, interested parties have a judicially enforceable right to comment on
proposed administrative regulations and to have those comments taken into
22
account by the regulatory agencies, but interested parties have no advanced
19. Tyson Barker & Garrett Workman, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership:
Ambitious but Achievable, Atlantic Council & Bertelsmann Foundation 3 (Apr. 2013)
http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/TTIPReport_web.pdf.
20. Id. at 4.
21. See James K. Hammitt et al., Precautionary Regulation in Europe and the United States: A
Quantitative Comparison, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1215, 1227 (2005); see also AHEARN, supra note 16, at 8.
22. See Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 494 F.3d 1092,
1096 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’) strictures at 5 U.S.C. § 553 . . . include
the duty to ‘give reasoned responses to all significant comments in a rulemaking proceeding.’” (quoting
Int’l Fabricare Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam))); Int’l
Fabricare Inst., 972 F.2d at 389 (“We will therefore overturn a rulemaking as arbitrary and capricious
where the EPA has failed to respond to specific challenges that are sufficiently central to its decision.”
(citing Am. Mining Congress v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 907 F.2d 1179, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
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opportunity to comment on primary legislation before Congress passes it. At
present, these disparities between the U.S. and EU legislative–regulatory
processes make truly parallel rulemaking impossible. The reality is that no
amount of goodwill can neutralize every transatlantic regulatory barrier—that
cannot be the goal.
However, this is not to say that real progress is out of reach. There is good
cause to believe that systemic regulatory cooperation is more plausible today
than it has been in the past. A 2009 revision of Europe’s Impact Assessment
Guidelines calls for a more receptive posture toward stakeholder input—at
24
least in the prelegislative consultation stage. The Lisbon Treaty, which went
into effect in 2009, allows the European Council and Parliament to delegate
lawmaking authority to the EC, while empowering the legislators to set the
25
scope of the delegation, revoke the delegation, and oppose delegated acts. At
the level of these delegated acts, opportunity for public comment is encouraged,
though not required, and stakeholder consultation is becoming more common.
Thus, delegated acts present a vehicle for increased accountability and
transparency as well as systematic consideration of transatlantic economic
effects. Increasing transparency, accountability, and stakeholder participation in
the EC’s development of proposed regulations and directives, however, remains
even more important to achieving the shared objective of transatlantic
regulatory compatibility.
III
EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEADERSHIP
The second lesson of the past efforts at transatlantic regulatory cooperation
has to do with institutional design. The Transatlantic Economic Council was
established on April 30, 2007, while I was Ambassador to the EU. After some
initial and significant successes, the TEC became “bogged down in single-issue
26
gridlock.” Despite its commitment thereafter to “play a central role in
27
strengthening our economies for the competitive challenges of the future,” the
Council has remained marginalized. This is a shame, because the TEC’s
aspirations coincided with TTIP’s goal of “eliminat[ing] unnecessary regulatory
28
divergences” in a wide range of sectors and disciplines.
23. Traditionally, major legislation has been preceded by congressional hearings, but in recent
years the hearing mechanism has been undermined when congressional leadership bypasses the
committee structure to pass politically significant legislation.
24. European Commission, at 19–20, SEC (2009) 92 final (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf.
25. See Council Directive 2010/30, 2010 O.J. (L153) 7 (EC) (“In preparation of a draft delegated
act, the Commission shall: . . . assess the impact of the act on the environment, end-users and
manufacturers, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in terms of competitiveness
including on markets outside the Union, innovation, market access and costs and benefits.”).
26. Barker & O’Connor, supra note 2, at 1.
27. TEC, Joint Statement, (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/TEC_
Joint_Statement_12-17-10.pdf.
28. See, e.g., Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Framework for Promoting Transatlantic
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So why did the TEC fail, and how can TTIP avoid a similar fate? On the
surface, the TEC’s failure was triggered by French opposition to a proposal to
permit the sale in Europe of chlorine-washed poultry. Chlorinated poultry from
the United States had been banned in Europe since 1997, at a cost of $200
29
million annually in lost sales. In 2008, the EC in coordination with the TEC
adopted a proposal to lift the chicken ban temporarily, pending further
30
scientific study. The French, who had been unenthusiastic about the TEC from
31
32
the beginning, used their EU presidency to undermine this agreement,
purportedly for environmental water pollution concerns—even though the
practice had never been shown to be detrimental to the environment (which in
33
any case involved water in the United States and not in France), and in spite of
34
the fact that France itself both exported chlorinated poultry at the time and
35
used chlorine to clean its own water.
But even more than protecting its own producers, the French opposition was
motivated by a general antagonism to the TEC and a desire to undermine a
promising proposal for mutual recognition of U.S. and EU accounting
36
standards. Specifically, the French opposed mark-to-market accounting
standards in both U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Standards and Europe’s
37
International Financial Reporting Standards. Unified U.S. and European
Economic Integration, Annex I: Fostering Cooperation and Reducing Regulatory Barriers, A.
Horizontal—Standards,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
(Jan.
22,
2010),
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/eu/tec/131810.htm.
29. Stephen Castle, EU Ban on U.S. Chicken Imports May Soon End, N.Y. TIMES, (May 13, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/business/worldbusiness/13iht-trade.4.12857143.html.
UEVP:
12–23
May 2008
(May
23,
2008),
30. EURALIA, BRIEFING NOTE,
http://www.fve.org/members/uevp/pdf/elan_reports/2008_05_12.23.pdf.
31. Jean Pisani-Ferry, a French economist who is now Commissioner General for Policy Planning
in the French government, once explained to me the popular sentiment in France that diluting French
sovereignty with twenty-seven other member states in the EU was bad enough—adding the United
States as a near equal partner in the TEC was more than they could stomach.
32. C. Boyden Gray, A Transatlantic Failure to Communicate, WASH. TIMES, (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/30/gray-a-transatlantic-failure-to-communicate/.
33. See RENÉE JOHNSON, U.S.–EU POULTRY DISPUTE ON THE USE OF PATHOGEN REDUCTION
TREATMENTS,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE
(PRTS)
2–3
(2012),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40199.pdf.
34. Castle, supra, note 29.
35. See G.A. Gagnon et al., Comparative Analysis of Chlorine Dioxide, Free Chlorine and
Chloramines on Bacterial Water Quality in Model Distribution Systems, 130 J. ENVTL. ENG’G 1269,
1270 (2004).
36. See Fact Sheet: Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration Through the Transatlantic
Economic Council, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 12, 2008) (“At its third meeting, the TEC . . . welcomed
acceptance of the use of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and International Financial
Reporting
Standards
in
EU
and
U.S.
financial
markets.”),
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081212-7.html.
37. See id.; accord Wikileaks, French Stress Markets in DepSec Kimmitt Consultations (Mar. 25,
2008), http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08PARIS555_a.html (“Bank of France Governor Noyer
said that . . . Monoline bond insurers have run into trouble, as have some hedge funds, and market
players are wondering what could be next. This is partly due to the practical challenges posed by ‘mark
to market’ accounting rule [sic] that impose pain and even panic, when markets fail to generate a price
that auditors can use for reference as to current value.”); id. at 14 (“Bankers . . . also noted the

GRAY_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2015]

UPGRADING EXISTING REGULATORY MECHANISMS

1/14/2016 1:21 PM

37

accounting standards would have forced some measure of mark-to-market
38
accounting standards on France. Due to exemptions in French accounting, its
financial system may not have survived the interdisciplinary adaptations
39
necessary to harmonize with the rest of Europe and the United States. When
the door closed on this accounting standards agreement, the United States and
Europe lost a valuable opportunity to change economic history for the better.
In some important respects, divergent financial regulatory approaches have
become more intractable in the years following the TEC’s failure, as the United
States and Europe pressed ahead with different approaches and on different
40
timetables.
In any event, the scarring fight over chicken weakened the TEC
considerably. A preliminary accounting standards agreement dissolved, and the
41
institution never fully regained its momentum. One lesson from this
experience is that the TEC is not as well designed as it could be to counter
obstructionism. The French were opposed to U.S. poultry and international
accounting standards for political reasons, and the TEC lacked the political
muscle to fight back.
At least part of the TEC’s problem, as reflected by its failure to overcome
the chicken episode, is its lack of centralized executive oversight. There may be
some irony in this observation, because the TEC was “designed, in part, to
generate the kind of high-level political support that previous initiatives may
42
have lacked.” At the time of the chicken debacle, the U.S. chair of the TEC
43
was the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. Despite
possibility that ‘mark to market’ rules for accounting were generating increased volatility and that
changing emphasis in prudential rules for banks were generating a ‘boomerang’ effect as assets were
brought back onto the balance sheet.”).
38. Conversation with Chris Cox, Former Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(July 8, 2015); Conversation with Chris Brummer, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law (July 9, 2015).
Chris Cox managed the U.S. side of the effort to unify accounting standards between the United States
and Europe. Accounting Standards: EU Commissioner McCreevy and SEC Chairman Cox Affirm
Commitment to Elimination of the Need for Reconciliation Requirements, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(Feb. 9, 2006), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-142_en.htm?locale=en. Chris Brummer is an
expert on international financial regulation having worked in Europe and the United States before
becoming a law professor. Chris Brummer Faculty Biography, GEORGETOWN LAW,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/brummer-chris.cfm#.
39. Conversation with Chris Cox, supra note 38; conversation with Chris Brummer, supra note 38.
40. See generally SHARON BOWLES & CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE:
TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL REFORM & THE G20 AGENDA 15 (2013) (“When one jurisdiction
introduces regulation in a particular area while the other has not, it can create suspicion—and even
expose a country to being less devoted or ‘softer’ in the relevant area of financial regulation.”).
41. See Suparna Karmakar, Prospects for Regulatory Convergence Under TTIP, BRUEGEL (Nov.
4
2013),
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/800-prospects-forregulatory- convergence -under-ttip/.
42. AHEARN, supra note 16, at 2; see also id. at 18 (“Given that the two TEC leaders are cabinetlevel appointees, the TEC was expected to have the kind of high-level political support that previous
efforts at economic integration may have lacked.”).
43. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Second Meeting of the Transatlantic Economic
Council: Joint Statement of the European Commission and the United States, U.S. Dep’t of State,
http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/104918.htm.
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his best efforts, he lacked the political clout to counter the French attack.
Would the result have been different if the U.S. chair had been closer to the
President—someone like the Vice President, with more of the gravitas of the
White House behind him? Or if the EU chair had been an official with a
broader institutional perspective on regulatory cooperation—such as the EU
Commission President? Who can say? Perhaps under such leadership, the TEC
could have anticipated and avoided the debacle. An agreement like TTIP is
crippled when responsibility for its implementation is placed in the hands of
staff too far removed from the chief executive.
Today the TEC is nominally chaired by Michael Froman, current United
States Trade Representative and former White House Deputy National Special
Advisor for International Economic Affairs, and the European Commissioner
for Trade, formerly Karel De Gucht. Froman and De Gucht have admirably
shepherded TTIP. But placing two trade specialists in charge of the TEC
highlights the risks of over-delegation in the area of transatlantic regulatory
cooperation. The TEC’s ambitious agenda has stalled, and the Council has not
44
met since 2013. To achieve its regulatory cooperation goals, TEC leadership
must be perceived as transcending trade and other sectoral concerns. Although
trade is important, it is ultimately secondary to TTIP’s regulatory cooperation
agenda.
The TEC experience teaches that the U.S. president must maintain a firmer
grip on transatlantic negotiations to prevent them from descending into
45
protectionist squabbles. Maintaining centralized control of transatlantic
regulatory cooperation would force the White House to set sectoral priorities
and to ensure that the whole apparatus of transatlantic regulatory cooperation
is not sabotaged by ultimatums concerning a single sector. TTIP presents an
opportunity to reinvigorate the TEC by making the U.S. Vice President and
46
President of the European Commission its co-chairs and by directing the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to work with the Vice President to
47
coordinate regulatory cooperation. This can be done through executive action.
The TEC was designed to be chaired by “a U.S. Cabinet-level official in the
48
Executive Office of the President” and a member of the EC. So, installing the

44. See TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC COUNCIL, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/eu/tec/ (last visited
Feb. 6, 2015); see also EU–USA—TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC COUNCIL, http://ec.europa.eu
/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/transatlantic-economiccouncil/index_en.htm (archived Feb. 2, 2015) (“This website is no longer being updated.”).
45. Executive leadership of transatlantic regulatory cooperation is more promising than legislative
leadership. Cf. AHEARN, supra note 16, at 21 (“While a more pro-active role for Congress would likely
enhance the political basis of support for transatlantic regulatory cooperation, it is no means certain
that there a consensus in favor of developing the necessary mechanisms and mandate to move in this
direction.”).
46. Other commentators have made a similar recommendation. See Barker & O’Connor, supra
note 2, at 9.
47. See infra, notes 56–59 and corresponding text.
48. Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration, supra note 15, § 4. The TEC’s
U.S. chair was initially Allan Hubbard, Director of the National Economic Council, and the EU chair
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U.S. Vice President and EU Commission President as co-chairs would require
neither legislation nor negotiation.
Recent history offers encouraging precedent for such a vice presidential
role. Consider President Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by
Vice President George H.W. Bush, and the successor Council on
Competitiveness, chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle—both widely
49
recognized as successes. The work of both entities went beyond general policy
pronouncements. Vice President Bush’s Task Force, for instance, directly
coordinated with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in
the OMB, and it often served to referee disagreements between OIRA and the
50
regulatory agencies about specific regulations. Or consider Vice President
Cheney, who chaired the influential National Energy Policy Development
51
Group, and Vice President Al Gore, whose debate with Ross Perot on the
North American Free Trade Agreement is widely credited with securing its
52
passage. Vice President Biden, former chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, is certainly well equipped to lead a transatlantic project
of this magnitude.
Giving the Vice President responsibility for promoting the U.S. position
would help to legitimize the TEC’s activities and move its plans beyond
brainstorming to implementation. This would also help to avoid the sectoralism
and single-issue disputes that might throw a wrench in the gears if the U.S. chair
were to represent a specific department of the federal government, like the
53
Secretary of Commerce or the U.S. Trade Representative. TTIP, like the TEC
54
before it, aims to be more than a trade deal. To succeed it must install in
supervisory roles executive branch officials with the political authority to
advance a comprehensive cooperative transatlantic regulatory agenda.
was initially Vice President Günter Verheugen, European Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry.
See Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic
Integration between the United States of America and the European Union, US DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/130772.htm.
49. See, e.g., Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform From Ford to Clinton, in
REGULATION
(2000),
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1991/1/
reg20n1a.html (noting that the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, along with the accompanying
executive order, had a “substantial impact”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-037, 13–14 (1995) (listing areas of
success for the Council on Competitiveness).
50. Weidenbaum, supra note 49.
51. See KEN G. GLOZER, CORN ETHANOL: WHO PAYS? WHO BENEFITS? 49, 52 (2011).
52. PHILIP A. MUNDO, NATIONAL POLITICS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE DOMESTIC SOURCES
OF U.S. TRADE POLICY 170 (1999).
53. See AHEARN, supra note 16, at 9 (“[N]either the Commerce Department nor the Office of
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the lead agencies for U.S. undertakings in the realm of
transatlantic regulatory cooperation, have authority to overhaul domestic regulatory policymaking.”).
54. Jordi Bacaria, TTIP: More than a Free Trade Agreement, BARCELONA CENTRE FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFIARS (Apr. 2015), http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/notes
_internacionals/ttip_more_than_a_free_trade_agreement (“TTIP is not envisaged as a classic trade
agreement that limits itself to eliminating tariffs and opening markets up to investment, services and
public procurement. Its importance . . . is that it claims to go further with the modification of the
technical rules and standards that are currently the greatest barriers to transatlantic trade.”).
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It is also critical that OIRA be involved in every effort related to regulatory
55
cooperation between the United States and Europe. Unlike typical free trade
agreements, TTIP is primarily about regulatory cooperation. The U.S.
perspective must therefore include the office that is the focal point of the U.S.
regulatory process. OIRA supervises the rule-making process across agencies
through review of major rules, and it provides the executive branch’s internal
56
enforcement of the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. No other
agency has the authority, expertise, or cross-disciplinary interest necessary to
implement forward-looking regulatory process reforms that transcend sectoral
57
issues. The U.S. Trade Representative in particular, though well-adapted to
implementing traditional free trade agreements, lacks the regulatory expertise
and system-wide viewpoint that a comprehensive agreement like TTIP
demands. And the President, by executive order, has expressly tasked the
OIRA Administrator with coordinating the government’s international
58
regulatory cooperation activities as chair of the Regulatory Working Group.
The U.S.–Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC), established in
2011, exemplifies the benefits of OIRA’s involvement in international
regulatory cooperation. The RCC has already witnessed success in reducing
59
nontariff barriers in response to several issue-specific initiatives. Moreover, the
RCC is now attempting to institutionalize a process for regulatory cooperation
60
that will continue to bear fruit in the future. This is due in large part to the
structure of the RCC. It has been driven by OIRA and by the Privy Council
Office, which serves a similar interagency coordination function in the
61
Canadian government.
55. OIRA is currently seriously understaffed due to pillaging by OMB, of which OIRA is a
component part. OIRA must be authorized to make hire personnel adequate to perform its current
mandate before it can reasonably be expected to take on a transnational regulatory cooperation
agenda.
56. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (2006). See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1838 (2013).
57. See generally Susan E. Dudley, Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 113, 115–16 (2011).
58. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 3 C.F.R. 13,609 (2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files
/omb/inforeg/eo_13609/eo13609_05012012.pdf. One scholar has noted that this executive order could
revive the previously defunct Regulatory Working Group by calling for coordination through that
Group. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1816
n.337 (2013).
59. See, e.g., Work Planning Format, REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL,
http://www.trade.gov/rcc/documents/a1-hc-fda-wp-pharmaceuticals-bio.pdf (Pharmaceuticals); Work
Planning Format, REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL, http://www.trade.gov/rcc/documents/b1pmra-epa-wp-it-solutions.pdf (Joint IT Solutions); Laureen Kinney & Susan McDemott, RCC Motor
Vehicles Working Group: Existing and New Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Work Plans, REGULATORY
COOPERATION COUNCIL, http://www.trade.gov/rcc/documents/f2-tc-dot-wp-motor-vehicle-std.pdf.
60. U.S.–Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, Joint Forward Plan 3 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-canada-rcc-joint-forward-plan.pdf (“Our
next phase of work will seek to make regulatory cooperation a routine, ingrained practice between
Canadian and U.S. regulatory authorities.”).
61. Terms of Reference for the U.S.–Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council 3 (June 3, 2011),
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IV
TRANSNATIONAL NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
In addition to these two lessons from the TEC, this article concludes with a
third, procedural suggestion. This article has already alluded to impact
assessments and stakeholder input and will not dwell on cost-benefit analysis,
which has already received significant attention by scholars on both sides of the
62
Atlantic. Rather, the focus of this article is negotiated rulemaking.
The success of an agreement like TTIP that is focused on regulatory
cooperation depends upon setting reasonable expectations. An approach that
accepted nothing less than joint rulemaking by U.S. and EU regulators would
fail inevitably, because the legislative and rule-making structures of these two
governments do not allow for perfect symmetry. What can be accomplished in
spite of procedural differences is true cooperation, in which U.S. and EU
regulators coordinate rulemakings and conscientiously involve the other party’s
regulators and businesses in their respective domestic regulatory processes.
And both the U.S. and EU regulatory systems already possess the necessary
tools.
In the typical notice-and-comment rulemaking in the United States, the
agency develops a proposed rule using whatever sources of information it has
available, and it then publishes the proposed rule without the benefit of formal
63
input from the entities the rule will affect. But only after the proposed rule has
issued do regulated entities and other concerned parties have an opportunity to
offer formal input on the content of the rule.
Foreign governments and regulators have the same opportunity as any other
interested party to comment on proposed federal rules in the United States.
The agency is required to consider and reasonably respond to significant public
64
comments before finalizing a rule, but the influence of such comments tends to
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-canada_rcc_terms_of_reference.pdf (“The
RCC will be co-chaired by high-level representatives of the central regulatory oversight agencies in
both governments.”).
62. Three points about cost-benefit analysis are worth mentioning briefly. First, further
development of Europe’s cost-benefit practice is critical to aligning the EU and U.S. rulemaking
systems. Second, the EC’s Impact Assessment Guidelines are compatible with a more rigorous costbenefit analysis. See European Commission, supra note 24, at 31 (“[Y]ou should select options that
promise the greatest net benefits.”); id. at 45 (“Full cost-benefit analysis should be used when the most
significant part of both costs and benefits can be quantified and monetised, and when there is a certain
degree of choice as regards the extent to which objectives should be met (as a function of the costs
associated with the proposed measures).”). Finally, both the United States and the EU should
incorporate consideration of transatlantic effects into their cost-benefit analyses. The EC’s guidelines
already require impact assessments to “establish whether proposed policy options have an impact on
relations with third countries.” Id. at 42. This “could include an analysis of similar regulations which
already exist in the EU’s main trading partners.” Id.
63. Agencies often discuss possible options with stakeholders informally and—less frequently—
solicit input through Advanced Notices of Proposed Rulemaking.
64. See Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 494 F.3d 1092,
1096 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Int’l Fabricare Inst. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).
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be limited. They typically represent competing viewpoints of parties with
conflicting interests who disagree about whether the agency does too much or
too little. Thus, even if one party’s comments could overcome the inertia of the
agency-drafted proposal, these comments are often effectively canceled out by
those of other parties. Typical notice-and-comment rulemaking does not
privilege the comments of foreign governments over those of any other member
of the public, so the capacity of foreign comments to nudge a proposed rule
toward harmonization with European law is limited.
Foreign regulators could have a much greater influence in negotiated
rulemaking (reg-neg). In reg-neg, the entities that will be affected by a rule are
included much earlier in the rule-making process—in the drafting of the
proposed rule—and provide input in a collaborative process rather than
66
independently of one another. The point is to allow stakeholders to strike
bargains that would not be feasible through ordinary notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
At its most ambitious, transnational reg-neg could work effectively as part
of a coordinated plan of rulemaking in the United States and the EU, to avoid
unnecessarily duplicative regulations. The EU’s own 2009 Impact Assessment
Guidelines could justify a roughly analogous mechanism for input by U.S.
regulators in the EU’s impact assessment process. But even a more modest
application of reg-neg could help reduce barriers to trade by inviting European
input in the drafting of specific U.S. rules with anticipated transatlantic effects.
Reg-neg has existed as an idea in the minds of academics since the mid67
1970s, but it started gaining momentum in the 1980s when the Environmental
Protection Agency engaged in several negotiated rulemakings, and it attracted
68
the support of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS).
69
Congress passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act in 1990, and made ACUS
70
the implementing agency.
Under the Act, a federal agency has discretion to establish a negotiated
rulemaking committee using, if it chooses, the services of a convener to identify

65. Shawn Donnan, US Pushes for Greater Transparency in EU Business Regulation, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e9b7190-9a65-11e3-8e06-00144feab7de.html#
axzz3f8PRbFoB (discussing the United States’ push for the EU to give businesses greater opportunity
for comment and to fully consider those comments).
66. See U.S.–Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, supra note 60, at 9 (“Collaboration may
also be valuable throughout our respective regulatory processes including during the early stages of the
development of regulations.”).
67. See Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation As a Means of Developing and
Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
141, 143 (1999).
68. David M. Pritzker, The Administrative Conference and the Development of Federal ADR,
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 29, 2014, 8:05 AM)
https://www.acus.gov/newsroom/administrative-fix-blog/administrative-conference-and-developmentfederal-adr.
69. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2012).
70. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L 101-648, 104 Stat. 1969, § 589 (1990).
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71

interested parties to participate in the negotiation. The agency publishes notice
of the negotiated rule-making committee, and interested parties not already
72
identified by the convener may apply for membership. Under the leadership of
a facilitator nominated by the agency and approved by the negotiated
rulemaking committee, the committee then attempts to reach consensus on a
73
proposed rule.
The benefits typically associated with reg-neg include improved information
due to the iterative nature of negotiation and the related incentive to
74
cooperate, the increased sense of legitimacy that parties involved in the
75
drafting process attribute to the resulting rule, closer correlation between the
76
77
78
final rule and the proposed rule, the avoidance of litigation, reduced delay,
and faster adaptation to the new rule by regulated entities involved from the
79
beginning.
Some critics of reg-neg have questioned whether it has actually achieved
80
these benefits in practice. But these criticisms turn on erroneous calculations
of the duration of various rule-making proceedings, and unfair comparisons of
traditional rulemaking and reg-neg, which tends, by design, to involve more

71.
72.
73.
74.

5 U.S.C. § 563 (2012).
Id. § 564.
Id. § 566.
See EDWARD P. WEBER, PLURALISM BY THE RULES: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 126 (1998) (“The interactive bargaining format is intended to
facilitate the flow of information among interested parties such that innovative bargains can be struck
in a timely manner that facilitates the interests of all players.”); see also Jody Freeman & Laura I.
Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 60, 121 (2000) (“On
balance, the combined results . . . of the study suggest that reg neg is superior to conventional
rulemaking on virtually all of the measures that were considered. Strikingly, the process engenders a
significant learning effect, especially compared to conventional rulemaking; participants report,
moreover, that this learning has long-term value not confined to the particular rulemaking.”).
75. Freeman & Langbein, supra note 74, at 232 (“Most significantly, the negotiation of rules
appears to enhance the legitimacy of outcomes. [The] data indicate that process matters to perceptions
of legitimacy. Moreover, . . . reg-neg participant reports of higher satisfaction could not be explained by
their assessment of the outcome alone. Instead higher satisfaction seems to arise in part from a
combination of process and substance variables.”). Stakeholder satisfaction is significant because of
“mounting evidence in social psychology that ‘satisfaction is one of the principal consequences of
procedural fairness.’” Id.
76. Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations and Other Rulemaking Processes: Strengths and
Weaknesses from an Industry Viewpoint, 46 DUKE L.J. 1429, 1434 (1997).
77. Id. (“Through direct participation, a sense of ‘ownership’ in the rule among participants is
thought to preempt the litigation considered inevitable for most EPA rulemaking efforts.”).
78. Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9
NYU ENVTL. L.J. 32, 45–49 (2000).
79. WEBER, supra note 74, at 127 (“[B]y giving stakeholders a direct role in writing the rule, as an
ex-EPA administrator explained, the likelihood is increased that players at the table ‘underst[and]
exactly what [is] meant by the regulation and what [is] expected of them once the regulation [is]
final.’”).
80. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip
Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386 (2001); Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Consensus: The Promise and
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle
& Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 195–202 (2005).
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complicated and contentious issues than garden-variety rulemaking. These
critics also point out that negotiated rulemaking has largely fallen into disuse,
but this is not because it is ineffective. Rather, individual agencies perceive regneg as diluting their regulatory authority, because interested parties are brought
into the process during the drafting of a proposed rulemaking, and agencies are
82
deterred by the up-front cost of reg-neg. For its part, OMB perceives rules
produced through reg-neg as less amenable to OMB input because they
represent a compromise between the responsible agency and interested
83
84
parties. But OMB can always review any rule before it is finalized. OMB can
85
even participate in the negotiation. And the tendency of negotiated
rulemaking to attract advance support from outside of the government is a
benefit, whether or not OMB perceives it that way.
The reformulated gasoline rule (RFG) is a good example of reg-neg
achieving a better result than could have been accomplished in the absence of
86
stakeholder input at the drafting stage. Like a rule with transnational
implications, the RFG rule was a good candidate for reg-neg because of its
complexity, and because collaboration with affected parties and other
regulators would result in better information than the convening agency could
87
obtain by itself. The process brought together thirty-five interested parties,
including oil interests, alcohol fuel producers, environmental advocates,
automotive manufacturers, state-level regulators, and the Department of
Energy.
The inclusion of state regulatory agencies in the RFG rulemaking offers a
good model for the involvement of foreign sovereigns in the rule-making
process. Along with environmental advocates, the state regulators insisted on “a
formal, written protocol guaranteeing that their good-faith bargaining efforts

81. See Philip J. Harter, A Plumber Responds to the Philosophers: A Comment on Professor
Menkel-Meadow’s Essay on Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 379 (2004); Harter, Assessing the
Assessors, supra note 78; Laura L. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus
Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RESEARCH & THEORY 599, 627 (2000); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The
(Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2008); Daniel P. Selmi,
The Promise and Limits of Negotiated Rulemaking: Evaluating the Negotiation of a Regional Air Quality
Rule, 35 ENVTL. L. 415 (2005).
82. Lubbers, supra note 81, at 997–98.
83. See id. at 999.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 40 C.F.R § 80.40 (2011); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives, 40 C.F.R § 80.83 (2006).
87. WEBER, supra note 74, at 127. Indeed the rulemaking was so ambitious and the timetable so
tight, that some considered it impossible. See id. at 124 (“Given the technical sophistication of the
EPA’s task, the time and resource constraints, and the number of players with high stakes on the table,
conflict and delay seemed inevitable.” This contributed to “considerable doubt that the RFG
rulemaking would be concluded by the congressionally mandated deadline.”). Id. at 131 (quoting
Richard Wilson of EPA’s Office of Mobile Service’s estimate “at no more than 50–50 that an
agreement, ‘at least in principle,’ would be reached.”).
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would not be wasted due to intervention from the Bush Administration.” I was
among the small group of high-level executive branch advisors that hashed out
89
the resulting protocol with the state regulators. Our protocol barred executive
branch intervention during and after the reg-neg and obligated stakeholders not
to litigate the final rule as long as it was consistent with the negotiated
rulemaking committee’s consensus. This preliminary agreement was crucial to
90
the success of the rulemaking. State regulators also influenced the negotiation
91
of a key bargain over the means used to reach compliance. In exchange for
allowing refiners to average the emissions of their total fuel pool, state
regulators and environmental organizations extracted a more stringent baseline
92
for emissions reductions and tougher emissions standards.
93
In the end, the RFG rulemaking was widely considered a success. The
compromise that allowed tougher-than-expected emissions standards in the
context of averaging could not have been achieved through traditional noticeand-comment procedure, which lacks the back-and-forth of reg-neg. As a result
94
of the negotiation, the rule was based on the best available scientific data, oil
interests were satisfied that they could comply with the new rule, and
environmentalists and regulators approvingly regarded it as more stringent than
95
the rule EPA would have issued otherwise. Most importantly, the state
regulators’ satisfaction with the rule meant that individual states were less likely
to implement their own competing emissions programs, which would have
96
resulted in duplicative regulatory regimes and high compliance costs.
This description of negotiated rulemaking in practice shows how reg-neg
could be adapted to the transatlantic context. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act
97
makes clear that the process is open to “innovation and experimentation,” so
policymakers should think creatively about its potential as a device for
promoting regulatory cooperation. Reg-neg works best for rulemakings that are
98
complex and controversial. And introducing transnational corporations and a
88. Id. at 130.
89. Id. The other advisors were Michael Boskin, counsel to Vice President Quayle’s Council for
Competitiveness, and Michael Elliot of EPA’s Office of General Council. Id.
90. CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA & DAVID J. SOUSA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 201 (2013) (“This ‘assurance mechanism’ . . . was crucial in securing the
participation of environmentalists and state regulators in the process. This would ensure that the
agreement would stick, giving the negotiated rule safe passage through the environmental policy
labyrinth.”).
91. WEBER, supra note 74, at 131–32.
92. Id. at 132–33.
93. See CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA & DAVID J. SOUSA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 200 (2013) (citing WEBER, supra note 77, at 120–42).
94. WEBER, supra note 74, at 138–39.
95. Id. at 137.
96. Id. at 138.
97. 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2012) (“Nothing in this subchapter should be construed as an attempt to limit
innovation and experimentation with the negotiated rulemaking process or with other innovative
rulemaking procedures otherwise authorized by law.”).
98. Harter, supra note 81, at 381 (“A reg-neg, then, is typically used only to address highly
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foreign sovereign into the picture adds a layer of complexity that would be well
served by reg-neg, even when the underlying regulation is straightforward.
In a transnational context involving foreign regulators, the role of convener
would become especially important. The TEC or some other existing agency or
officer with responsibility in the field of international regulatory cooperation
could serve as the statutory “convener,” to “identify[] persons who will be
significantly affected by a proposed rule,” to “conduct[] discussions with such
persons to identify the issues of concern to such persons,” and to identify
“persons who are willing and qualified to represent interests that will be
99
significantly affected by the proposed rule.” These interested persons would
include transatlantic businesses as well as regulators from both the EU and the
United States.
European regulators should welcome the opportunity to participate in regneg in the United States. The process would give them access to valuable data
and help to strengthen relationships with their U.S. counterparts. Reg-neg could
also allow European regulators to have a say in the resulting rule. Nothing
prevents them from exerting the same kind of pressure that state regulators
exerted in the RFG negotiated rulemaking.
A preliminary agreement like the protocol in the RFG rulemaking could
help to define the foreign regulators’ roles in the reg-neg and maximize the
benefits of transnational regulatory cooperation. For example, in exchange for
their support and an agreement to prioritize convergence in their own related
rulemakings, European regulators would gain the information exchanged in the
reg-neg and an opportunity to influence their U.S. counterparts. But even short
of a formal agreement, regulators who participate in the other party’s
negotiated rulemaking and buy into the consensus position would be more
likely to advocate adoption of a similar regulatory approach in Europe.
If transatlantic reg-neg works in the United States, it may influence the EC
to experiment with a similar process by including U.S. businesses and regulators
in the stakeholder consultation process. The EU’s Impact Assessment
Guidelines already encourage consultation of affected stakeholders early in the
EU regulatory process, and there is no reason that U.S. regulators could not be
included. More recently, the EC has promised to “continue to improve its
planning of consultations through the preparation of consultation strategies at
the policy preparation stage” and to adopt new internal guidelines “with a view
100
to enhance the quality of consultations.” Those new guidelines should
establish procedures for involving U.S. regulators at the consultation stage to
101
enable “comparison of policy options” when significant transatlantic effects

complex and controversial rules.”).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 563 (2012).
100. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 14, COM (2014) 368 final (June
18, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/docs/com2014_368_en.pdf.
101. European Commission, supra note 24.
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are at stake. Especially when conducted in tandem or in close sequence,
regulatory negotiation in the United States and Europe could contribute to
valuable regulatory convergence.
V
CONCLUSION
This article offers some realistic suggestions for advancing transatlantic
regulatory cooperation. Reinvigorating the TEC with high-level leadership and
inviting European regulators to participate in negotiated rulemakings are both
developments that could be integrated into a successful TTIP. But nothing
prevents the United States and the EU from taking these practical steps now.
Indeed, demonstrating the success of U.S.–EU cooperation in a strategically
targeted reg-neg overseen by a TEC, which in turn would be chaired by the U.S.
Vice President and EU Commission President, could add momentum to the
TTIP negotiations and help to solidify sorely needed political support for the
agreement.
Consider, for example, a negotiated Environmental Protection Agency
rulemaking convened by the TEC, with participation from U.S. and European
auto manufacturers and regulators seeking to establish a new minimum octane
102
rating for U.S. market fuel. U.S. manufacturers must meet increasingly
stringent fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas regulations; to do so, they want to
be able to build next-generation vehicles with efficient high-compression
103
104
engines. Such vehicles are already available in Europe, but they require a
105
higher-octane fuel than the U.S. standard 87 AKI. A reg-neg with the
participation of European automakers and regulators could enable more
efficient, less polluting vehicles in the United States, and could achieve valuable
standardization between the U.S. and European auto markets. Regulators and
industries could nominate other policies in various sectors that could serve as
models of transatlantic cooperation through negotiated rulemaking.
102. Cf. U.S.–Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, supra note 60, at 19 (“Environment
Canada and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency will continue collaborating under the U.S.–
Canada Air Quality Committee (AQC) towards the development of aligned vehicle and engine
emission regulations and their coordinated implementation.”).
103. See Robert Babik, General Motors LLC, Comments on Proposed Tier 3 Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR2011-0135-4288, at 14 (June 28, 2013); Julian Soell & R. Thomas Brunner, Mercedes-Benz, Comments
on Proposed Tier 3 Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135-4676, at 3–4 (June 28, 2013); Cynthia Williams,
Ford Motor Company, Comments on Proposed Tier 3 Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135-4349, at 3, 16–
17 (July 1, 2013) [hereinafter Ford Comments].
104. See Ford Comments, supra note 103, at 17 (“High compression ratio engines are already found
in Europe . . . . [T]he introduction of higher octane rated/intermediate level ethanol blend fuel would
allow for a faster introduction of more efficient vehicle designs from Europe with lower CO2 emissions
and increased efficiency . . . without the need for significant design changes.”).
105. See Stephen Douglas & Julia Rege, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers & Association of
Global Automakers, Comments on Proposed Tier 3 Rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135-4461, at 52–53
(July 1, 2013); Ford Comments, supra note 103, Appendix A: Literature Review of the Benefits of High
Octane/High Ethanol Fuels, at 2.
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More than proving the merit of these specific ideas, this article seeks to
encourage creative thinking about repurposing existing regulatory institutions
and mechanisms in the transnational context. In a world of ever more complex
regulatory systems, creative approaches to regulatory cooperation will be
critical to the continued vitality of U.S.–European leadership in the global
economy.

